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ABSTRACT
The G20 has two distinctive features that make it a unique forum in
global politics. First, it is one of the few existing global platforms
where diﬀerent international institutions and regional
organisations can coordinate across a vast array of issue areas and
emergent policy ﬁelds. Second, it is an institution that brings
together heads of government which control roughly 80% of
world GDP. Despite these features, the G20 lacks constitutive
authority of its own, bound by a consensus principle which
sharply delimits its scope of action. Notwithstanding its
circumspect authority, no recent international body has garnered
more attention from transnational civil society groups and
advocacy networks than the G20. Most of this attention is critical
and points to legitimacy problems. We argue that these
legitimacy problems derive from a perception of untapped
potential and undue privilege for great powers. Against this
backdrop, we submit that a more active and institutionalised
forum – with clear decision-making procedures for exercising
authority – could help mitigate resistance and contribute to a
more legitimate global governance system overall.
KEYWORDS
G20; global governance;
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Introduction
The idea for a regular summit convening the world’s most powerful economies was
put forward by French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and German Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt. Through their initiative the ﬁrst summit was held at the Chateau de
Rambouillet near Paris in November 1975. In the gardens of Rambouillet the heads of
government of France, West Germany, the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom
and Italy discussed the oil shock, the ﬁnancial crisis and the general economic malaise
which had come to deﬁne the mid 1970s. At this ﬁrst G6 summit, they adopted a
15-point communiqué, the Declaration of Rambouillet, and agreed to meet in future
once a year under a rotating presidency. In 1976 Canada joined the forum to complete
the G7, as did representatives from the European Community soon thereafter as a
non-enumerated member.
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More than two decades later a new G-format composed of the G20 ﬁnance ministers
was convened to confront a new set of challenges: one immediate and one more endur-
ing. The immediate challenge came in the form of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis in 1997, which
required a coordinated response by the world’s largest economies. The second and more
enduring challenge was a representation deﬁcit which emerged at the latest in the mid-
1990s with the rise of new economic powers. It was in the midst of these challenges that
the G20 ﬁnance ministers held their inaugural meeting in 1999, consisting of a newly
expanded G8 including the Russian Federation, along with key regional powers plus the
European Union.
Owing in part to the success of this ﬁrst round of G20 ﬁnance meetings, the idea for a
G20 summit convening heads of government was ﬁrst ﬂoated. The new summit initiative
was led by Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin, formerly Canada’s ﬁnance minister. He
campaigned actively for an expanded global forum which would bring together heads
of government, especially as the disadvantages of the limited G8 format were becoming
clearer. The chair of the 2005 G8 summit, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, responded by
inviting ﬁve key developing countries to the Gleneagles, Scotland, meeting: Brazil, China,
India, Mexico and South Africa. The 2007 Heiligendamm Summit in Germany regularised
the relationship among the ‘G8 + 5’, establishing a schedule for regular ministerial meet-
ings among the 13 countries.
Despite its initial promise, the so-called ‘Heiligendamm Process’ proved inadequate.
Reﬂecting on the inappropriateness of the process, Paul Martin stated: ‘The image of Hu
Jintao, the president of China, and Manmohan Singh, the Prime Minister of India –
leaders of the two most populous countries on earth, quite possibly destined to be the
largest economies on earth within our lifetimes – waiting outside while we held our G8
meetings, coming in for lunch, and then being ushered from the room so that we could
resume our discussions among ourselves, is one that stayed with me… Either the world
will reform its institutions, including the G8, to embrace these new economic giants, or
they will go ahead and establish their own institutions’.1
Responding to the snub, Prime Minister Singh was altogether more piercing in his
remarks: the so-called plus ﬁve had been ‘invited to the anteroom of the rich man’s
club, but not let into the dining hall’.2 The scene was reminiscent of a Victorian era
parlour. It was by all accounts a humiliation. The Indian press lamented in one stinging edi-
torial: ‘That’s not the stuﬀ of which reformers are made’.3 The message to emerging
powers was clear; they were not yet on equal footing.
The Heiligendamm Process was thus only a transitional step in the direction of
inclusion. It was not until the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–2008 that real institutional
change became possible. Indeed, none of the existing political and economic insti-
tutions – the International Monetary Fund, the G8, the United Nations or the grouping
of ﬁnance ministers – were suﬃciently able to coordinate policies during the crisis.
Amid this uncertainty the G20 was born. The ﬁrst G20 summit took place on November
14 and 15, 2008. In general, the ﬁrst round of G20 summits can be counted as a success
and were eﬀective in mitigating the worst consequences of the ﬁnancial crisis. Yet the
larger takeaway is that more could have been done to place global governance on
ﬁrmer ground.
This short history of the G20 already points to three important features. First, the various
initiatives for institutionalising the diﬀerent G-formats originated from middle powers.
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Although the summits were meant to bring together a concert of economic powers, it was
predominantly middle powers which seized the opportunity to develop the G-format, in
part because they hoped to move up the ladder of state hierarchy by playing a more
central role in global governance.4 While US leadership did not oppose these initiatives,
the G-format was not an institution established at the behest of the hegemon.
Second, it was the functional requirements for crisis management which spurred
middle power initiatives. The oil shock was conducive for setting up the ﬁrst ﬁreplace
meeting in Rambouillet, a wariness of Russian drift away from Western institutions led
to the expansion of the G8 format in 1999, and the need to have China on board to
respond to the 2007–2008 ﬁnancial crises made the G20 format possible. Stated simply,
as the distribution of economic power became increasingly diﬀuse, eﬀective crises man-
agement depended on a more representative G-forum. Whereas in 1975 the G7 controlled
roughly 70% of the world’s GDP, the G20 today brings together heads of government
which control roughly 80%.
The third feature is implicit, but important for our argument: the thematic orientation
of the G-format is ﬂexible. What started as an executive’s club to navigate global macro-
economic problems has increased its scope over time to include a remarkable array of
issue areas including economic, ﬁnancial, environmental, human rights and security
concerns. The 2019 summit in Osaka, Japan, saw eight ministerial meetings take place
over six months and brought together a litany of regional and international organisations
from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to the African
Union. A message from Prime Minister Shinzo Abe read in part ‘[Japan] will exert strong
leadership in discussions aimed towards resolving global issues such as climate change’
and directly engaged with the impacts of digitalisation, ageing societies and rising
income inequality.5
Even so, the G20 cannot make decisions without the consent of all participating states.
The G20 is thus no more than a deliberative forum: it lacks formal authority of its own and
remains remarkably circumspect despite its breadth of activities. Various scholars suggest
that the G20’s informality and non-binding quality sets it apart from other more cumber-
some organisations, and that it should ‘resist external pressure’ to formalise.6 In this view,
informality and non-binding commitments are the key for success. Namely, it keeps
avenues of communication open between heads of government and leading international
organisations – especially in times of crisis – while also avoiding legitimacy concerns
associated with other (more formal and authoritative) institutions.7
This paper argues against the mainstream approval of informality and lack of authority.
We submit that a chartered international forum which empowers the G20 to develop its
meta-governance potential could help guarantee a more eﬀective and legitimate body.
It would thus ensure greater inclusivity and access for various state and non-state
actors. Thus, we envisage decision-making procedures beyond consensus, coupled with
transparency guidelines and a formalised consultation process for civil society. Doing so
would not only enhance coordination eﬀorts across a wide array of issue areas, but directly
address concerns that global governance in general is opaque and aloof.
This paper proceeds in four sections. The ﬁrst part analyses the legitimacy problems of
global governance in general and speciﬁcally the G-summits. We identify two major
deﬁcits which decrease popular legitimacy. First, a lack of meta-governance hinders
eﬀective coordination and undercuts public debates on global governance issues. This
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undermines transparency in decision-making processes and eventually, trust in global
governance. Second, the legal grey-zone of informality unduly beneﬁts great powers
and corporate interests thus further hurting its legitimacy. In the second section, the
paper goes on to suggest how the G20 could be reformed to ameliorate these negative
dynamics. We focus on empowerment, formal and transparent decision-making and
open access as three normative goals for institutional reform. The third section outlines
potential problems with such a reform, including various sources of opposition to it.
The paper concludes with an endorsement of institutionalisation, recommending its
potential to help break global governance gridlock and boost system-wide validity.
Legitimation problems of global governance8
From the early 1990s on a global governance system emerged. This global governance
system is more than the sum of the institutions that produce regulations; it is about the
interplay and the relationship between these institutions, and their embedding in a nor-
mative order. It selects inputs from actors inside and outside of the system and allocates
responsibility to institutions on diﬀerent political levels. It produces transnational and
international regulations, and other governance activities such as agenda setting, monitor-
ing, adjudication and enforcement. All of these outputs are justiﬁed with reference to
global common goods and thus come with a minimal level of ‘compliance pull’ for both
the involved states and their societies.9 Although most of these outputs are regulatory,
they also aﬀect the (re-)distribution of costs and beneﬁts between and within national
societies.
The global governance system emerged as a consequence of the post-Second World
War order. It includes the rise of international authority and the transition from welfare-
state embedded liberalism to a more intrusive post-national liberalism. At the same
time, today’s global governance system is rooted in a normative and institutional structure
that contains hierarchies and power inequalities, and thus endogenously produces con-
testation and distributional struggles. While the global governance system has normative
aspirations, it also contains institutions that can hardly be described as fair or just, and it
knows violence.
The global governance system is deﬁned by three distinct yet interlinked layers: the ﬁrst
includes normative principles; namely, the understanding that there are some global
goods which transcend the notion of national interest and therefore create a demand
for institutions with some authority over its members. Second, the global governance
system is made up of a dense set of speciﬁc political institutions such as the World
Trade Organisation (WTO), the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), all of which have developed and extended their authority over time. These
international authorities are at the core of the global governance system, with many adja-
cent organisations and institutions populated around them. The third layer refers to the
interactions between diﬀerent spheres of authority and the institutions within them.
Namely, that they are loosely coupled with each other. The tools used to manage
conﬂicts between diﬀerent spheres of authority (eg, between trade and health institutions)
are rudimentary at best. It is the interaction between these diﬀerent spheres of authority or
more speciﬁcally, lack of meta-authority, which bears some responsibility for the present
legitimacy crisis in global governance.
4 R BENSON AND M ZÜRN
This lack of meta-governance aggravates legitimacy problems by privileging sector-
speciﬁc and technocratic discourses over broader political debates, adding to the
impression that global governance is at best opaque. At the same time, there is no
clear separation of powers between diﬀerent spheres of authority. This gives the most
powerful states control over the application and implementation of international rules.
Thus, institutional inequality between states acts to encourage the arbitrary application
of international norms: undermining the regulative idea that like cases should be
treated with parity.
Against this backdrop, the G20 does not live up to its potential for legitimately coordi-
nating between diﬀerent spheres of authority. The G20 needs to increase its competences,
exercise authority beyond state consensus and widen its scope of participation. Doing so
could help ameliorate some of the more signiﬁcant legitimacy deﬁcits faced by global gov-
ernance as a whole.
The G20 fails to provide meta-governance
The global governance system can be described as one of loosely coupled spheres of auth-
ority.10 In each issue area a set of transnational and international institutions, some of
them exercising authority, has developed. Within some of these spheres of authority,
coordination between institutions takes place, even when it is often insuﬃcient. Yet
when it comes to the interaction and especially collision between diﬀerent spheres of
authority, take for example between trade policy and climate change, there is no single
institution in place that can coordinate. Whereas the modern nation state has established
instances of meta-authority (eg, governments, parliaments, supreme courts, and an estab-
lished public sphere) that step in when there is conﬂict, the global governance system at
best only knows informal meta-authorities such as hegemons. With the decline of US
hegemony, the global governance system now lacks any real meta-authority.
The G20 is best suited to ﬁll the gap in meta-authority. This not only means having the
mandate to delegate between existing international organisations, but also to set the
agenda for global governance more broadly. At present, however, the G20 does not
suﬃciently coordinate between diﬀerent spheres of authority where governance objec-
tives sometimes collide. The result is an institution which squanders its leadership
potential.
The inability of the G20 to pass meaningful ﬁnancial regulations in the wake of the sub-
prime crisis serves as a point in case. In a much-anticipated series of meetings, the G20
agreed to harmonise international regulatory frameworks to safeguard global ﬁnancial
stability. Notwithstanding progress on ﬁscal and monetary policy, the Washington,
London and Pittsburgh summits left major structural reforms untouched. A recent
report from the Financial Stability Board (FSB) bluntly warned that ‘loosening lending stan-
dards’ and ‘elevated asset values’ were again posing a signiﬁcant risk to continued
ﬁnancial stability.11 Although the G20 intervened into the ﬁnancial sphere, it did so
tepidly, failing to provide eﬀective meta-governance. The missed opportunity is indicative
of a broader failure of global governance. That is, a failure to connect the dots. Despite an
abundance of resources at their disposal and more than enough domestic political will to
tackle banking regulation, there was no central authority to orchestrate the kind of
response required.
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At present the G-forum can merely delegate to diﬀerent international organisations, but
rarely does it engage in a direct mediation of solutions across institutions. The result is a
legal and political morass. Even the business press has joined the chorus of concern. The
Financial Times published an opinion piece after the London Summit entitled ‘The Group
of 20 Must be Stopped’ and noted that when decisions are made behind closed doors,
opportunities to advance competing ideas are sharply curtailed.12 Secret handshakes
and backroom deals are not only bad for global democracy, they also create bad policy.
In this regard, the role of meta-governance could be palliative. By linking various
centres of expertise together, better and more creative solutions are possible.
Taking up the role of meta-authority would make global governance not only more
eﬀective but would also create opportunities for public scrutiny and debates. The current
model oﬀers minimal opportunities for outside engagement. It is no small wonder that
the G-forum faces accusations of elitism, foreclosing new ideas.13 In the absence of open
and honest public debates, resistance to global governance grows. Detached from the
public mood, international institutions are rendered isolated and aloof. As lines of communi-
cation break down, spaces open for all manner of conspiracy theories. The ensuing con-
fusion gives ammunition to populists from both the right and left who seek to withdraw
from the international project. By curtailing access to information, policymakers run the
risk of feeding the populist narrative. As a ﬁrst step to combatting decline, global govern-
ance institutions should invest in public debates which are inclusive and transparent.
Doing so, however, requires sites of meta-authority, where decisions about general political
directions and orientations are made, which, in turn, make public debates possible.
The G20 fails to overcome institutionalised inequality
A weak separation of powers within the global governance system privileges powerful
state actors and undermines the normative principle that alike cases are treated alike.
Indeed, authoritative international institutions like the UNSC contain formal mechanisms
for assuring great power interests. These international institutions not only reinforce
inequality between states, but also hierarchy within the international system.14
Like the UNSC, the current G20 arrangement acts only to exacerbate power imbalances.
Bilateral talks between powerful states are often decisive, leaving other participants as
mere passive observers. Often, critical sections of the ﬁnal communiqué are only disclosed
moments before the closing session. In this sense, the summit format excludes issues
which are not in the immediate interest of established powers. Undoubtedly, a more
even-handed application of international norms would look diﬀerent.
The informality of the G-forum also provides cover for the exercise of power in the
name of speciﬁc interest groups. To emphasise the point, a 2016 report co-published by
the Global Policy Forum and Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung recounts the incredulous relationships
between policy makers, business insiders and powerbrokers. During the 2014 summit in
Brisbane, Australia, the coal industry was given special access to ‘repeatedly promote
coal as a solution for energy poverty’. The resulting controversy prompted Australian
Prime Minister Tony Abbott to claim ‘coal is good for humanity’, much to the consternation
of local media.15 Such a dynamic has led scholars to argue that the G20 has supplanted US
hegemony as the most eﬀective enforcer of pro-business policy16 – a position reinforced
by the Trump administration’s mercurial attitude towards free trade.
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Institutionalised inequality hampers the impartial exercise of authority and thus feeds
the narrative of an ‘insider’s only club’.17 This in/out narrative alienates civil society groups,
who routinely complain that they are denied consideration.18 More speciﬁcally, civil
society groups argue that in the absence of public scrutiny, a revolving door of industry
and business sets the agenda. Taken together, these power imbalances produce severe legit-
imation problems for the global governance system. We can thus observe a rapid increase in
politicisation from societal actors and contestation from rising state powers. Despite, or
because of, its relative informality and lack of authority, the G-forum faces signiﬁcant criticism
from transnational social movements and from excluded states.19 On the one hand, these
criticisms target its lack of eﬀectiveness and missed opportunity for coordinating global
governance. On the other hand, G20 summits are pilloried for their double bias: in favour
of great powers and transnational elites. Addressing the G20’s lack of meta-governance
and overcoming its entrenched inequalities is therefore crucial to regain its legitimacy.
A reform to increase legitimacy
The G20 should be reformed to ameliorate these negative dynamics. A chartered inter-
national forum which empowers the G20 to develop its meta-governance potential
would guarantee a more transparent and rules-based forum. Thus, we envisage clear
decision-making procedures beyond consensus, the limiting of informality and a built-in
consultation process for civil society.
Such an argument is not necessarily popular. A well-established literature on informal
intergovernmental organisations (IIGOs) touts their eﬀectiveness as having ‘lower nego-
tiating costs’ and having less cumbersome ‘commitments’.20 Indeed, without legally
binding rules IIGOs, like the G20, can engage in high stakes negotiations more
ﬂexibly.21 Notwithstanding these beneﬁts, the existing literature fails to seriously
grapple with the deﬁcits of informal institutions particularly when they lie at the cross-
roads of public and private power.22
Therefore, we argue for reforms that formalise authority and limit informality. Scholars
have long pointed out the paradox of a steering committee with no helm or rudder.23
Here, Payne adopts a telling metaphor: ‘The deeper problem is that the G20, as presently
set up, is at heart only a vessel, largely empty of political direction until and unless it is
periodically re-fueled with new initiatives and priorities’.24 Put diﬀerently, the G-forum fun-
damentally lacks a purpose. Aside from periodic crisis where it is forced to take action, it is
left running idle. Worse yet, it is during these interim periods of stasis that global govern-
ance stagnates.
The broader pointmay be thatwe have entered a period of lasting crisis and can no longer
aﬀord simply to muddle through: issues range from climate change, to the ongoing
instability of ﬁnancial markets, severe security problems, and trade wars. Thus, investing in
a coordinating body which can command the limbs of global governance is an urgent task.
Empowering meta-governance
The G20 should exercise meta-governance for two reasons. The ﬁrst is explicit, but none-
theless important to reiterate. Meta-governance is necessary for coordinating between
existing institutions, thus making them more eﬀective. Synchronising international
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organisations, regional organisations, regulatory agencies and private public partnerships
could dramatically increase the performance of global governance. For example, the task
of combating and now increasingly preparing for climate change demands coordination
across continents. The enormity of the challenge calls for a vast array of skillsets and exper-
tise, endless hours of scientiﬁc endeavour and the need for social, political and legal
capital. And yet when it comes to climate change, the global governance system is radi-
cally ill-prepared. Part of the reason is a lack of coordination between institutions
already tasked with combatting it. More concerning, however, is the absence of coordi-
nation between tangentially related institutions (eg, the WTO or OECD), who may not
have legally explicit climate mandates, but nonetheless have important roles to play in
lowering emissions.
To the extent that the G20 is a multilateral steering committee, it is best placed to
improve coordination. This does not mean usurping the competencies of other bodies.
Existing structures can and should remain in place. What the G-forum can oﬀer is a way
to connect the dots. Climate change is just one pressing example of where coordination
is needed. The potential for a global pandemic or a large-scale cyber-attack would in their
own right require an immediate and coordinated response. If these threats are real, it is
essential that plans are put in place.
Investing in meta-governance could oﬀer much needed political direction and help in
harmonising overlapping authorities. Scholars of cosmopolitanism have long argued for
a more constitutionalised system of global governance.25 A G20 executive, complete
with a permanent secretariat and inﬂuence over other global governance institutions like
the OECD, IMF and World Bank, could set an agenda appropriate for the challenges
ahead.26 Such thinking is in line with policymakers who view the G20 as a focal point for
coordinating across competencies, international institutions and regional organisations.
The second reason for establishing meta-authority is its expected knock-on eﬀect on
the public sphere. Namely, a more prominent role for the G20 could lead to large-scale
societal debates. By providing a platform that is truly global in scope, the G20 could insti-
gate public debates on transnational policy issues across a multiplicity of ﬁelds. As long as
global governance institutions remain in their sectoral niches, their decision-making is
bound to remain technocratic. If the G20 were to host debates on the relative importance
of, for example, sustainable development vis-à-vis climate change, the nucleus of a world
societal debate that transcends national boundaries could emerge.
Indeed, the magnitude of the problems we face in the years and decades ahead
requires creativity and openness instead of closed doors. Eﬀective meta-governance
could help to dislodge organisations from their ideological torpor and put them in conver-
sation with new ideas. Questioning assumptions matters, especially in global governance
where distinct organisational cultures can lead to groupthink. Here, meta-governance has
an important role to play in fostering creative disruption. It is our belief that empowering
meta-governance through an institutionalised G20 could help foster a more creative and
responsive approach to global governance.
Overcoming institutionalised inequality via transparent procedures
Tackling informality and establishing rule-based decision-makingprocedures is an important
step towards overcoming institutionalised inequality and legitimating global governance.
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This would bring two major beneﬁts to the G20 and the global governance system more
broadly. First and foremost, clear and public decision-making procedures create checks on
the selective use of power. This ultimately ensures that alike cases are treated alike. In
turn, appearances of impropriety (both real and imagined) would be minimised.
A set of clear decision-making procedures is vital for any international organisation,
let alone a body which calls itself the ‘premier forum’ in global politics.27 The G-format
has been bitterly criticised on this count. For example, the French global justice syndicate
Attac memorably condemned the G-format as a secretive rich man’s club which acts to
perpetuate power imbalances in the international system.28 The image of world leaders
sauntering around manicured estates and holding closed door meetings in genteel
sitting rooms certainly does not inspire conﬁdence. Attac does not object to the
concept of global governance per se, but fears that backroom deals will only serve the
interests of those who already beneﬁt from access. A more institutionalised G20 with
clear procedural guidelines reduces the legal/political grey-zone much derided by social
movements and begins to address legitimacy concerns.
As the decisions taken at the level of global governance becomemore intrusive fair pro-
cedures must be taken seriously. Transcripts of meetings should be accessible, as should
lists of invitees and other guests. Ultimately, overcoming institutionalised inequality will
not only help regain public conﬁdence in global governance, but also improve outcomes.
Overcoming institutionalised inequality likewise opens the black box of executive mul-
tilateralism. That is, it demystiﬁes a global forum which for decades has been fodder for
conspiracy theories. With the rise of extremist groups stoking anti-establishment resent-
ment, corrective action should be taken to clean the air, or at least present an alternative
narrative. This task has taken on a new sense of urgency in the age of social media, where
mistruths and fake news have led to episodes of confusion.29 One particular example is
worth repeating. Shortly after the G20 summit in Shanghai/Hangzhou it was widely
reported that central bankers colluded to let foreign currencies appreciate against the
dollar.30 For many it was the perfect plot – undermining a strong dollar would beneﬁt
speculators – except none of it was true.
Establishing fair and transparent decision-making procedures is by no means a panacea
for disinformation. However, it does represent a start. Ignoring the peripheral chatter of
the extreme right and left is no longer a tenable option. To be sure, there are also instances
of real impropriety which should be exposed. The Global Policy Forum, for example, has
documented multiple instances of favourable access for business insiders at the G20;
this included, as discussed earlier, a cosy relationship with the energy sector.31 Neverthe-
less, information black-outs will inevitably lead some to believe the worst, presenting an
even greater danger to the longevity of global institutions such as the G20.
A more institutionalised G20 with clear membership guidelines would help modernise
the forum, while also working to redress grievances of inadequate representation and
closed decision-making. Here we endorse Vestergaard and Wade’s idea for a revised
Bretton Woods System.32 Their plan, ﬁrst prepared as a policy brief for the Danish Institute
of International Studies, envisages a reformed G20 which they call a ‘Global Economic
Council’. The council would be comprised of ‘25 country constituencies’ and would
follow a similar institutional design to that of the IMF and World Bank Governing
Boards. To ensure maximum participation, the new council would be vested with a rotat-
ing chair complete with country alternates and procedures for domestic consultation.
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The proposal is informed by ‘two major principles’. The ﬁrst principle allocates chairs
evenly among regions of the world including Africa, Asia, the Americas, Australasia, and
Europe. The second principle would allocate chairs by ‘economic weight’ as determined
by a region’s GDP. Such a proposal would go a long way to addressing regional imbal-
ances. Not only would the distribution of seats reﬂect emerging economic realities, but
it would also answer the enduring criticism of a Euro-American-Japanese-Chinese
concert of power. Such an innovation could help break ‘global governance gridlock’
and spur action on a range of transnational policy concerns.33
At the same time, a modiﬁed G20 could provide civil society with a more meaningful
lobbying platform, ensuring access to policymakers. Since 2013, the C20 engagement
group has made important strides towards inclusion with a stated goal ‘[of generating]
spaces to discuss and build, through transparent and inclusive processes, high-level
policy papers’.34 As of 2019, the C20 has 10 distinct working groups, including those on
gender, global health, the environment and education. Additional outreach groups
draw on the expertise of think tanks, labour unions and youth organisations. Although out-
reach initiatives have achieved representation for important causes, their role remains pre-
dominantly advisory.35 Building on the G20 outreach model means formalising the
outreach mechanisms.36 We therefore call for an institutionalised consultation process,
where civil society groups are integrated into a single secretariat and contribute at the
level of oﬃcial policy discussions. Such an arrangement could provide much needed direc-
tion for transnational policy while also ensuring that a plurality of global voices are heard.
Ensuring that decisions are made in a transparent and equitable fashion is likely to
increase the normative appeal of global governance, thereby reinforcing its relationship
with the people and communities it is meant to serve.
Potential problems
Even if addressing informality and further institutionalisation looks more logical than ever,
the politics of implementing it could not be more complicated. Opposition by nationalist
forces may be ﬁerce, great powers may fear losing their privileged status, and business
interests may struggle to keep their special access.
Reworking the G20 to reﬂect a plurality of regional and state interests will undoubtedly
be met with opposition. There are two dominate critiques of institutional reform. The ﬁrst
critique revolves around realpolitik, namely the unfeasibility of achieving reforms given
opposition from state coalitions – most notably from populist governments. Although
critics are well-founded in their scepticism, we hold that it makes sense to separate the
functionalist from the feasibility arguments.37
We begin with the functionality issue. There is no question that functionality is not
a suﬃcient condition for success in itself. However, it is hard to imagine how global
problems can be solved without global rules. While the full-scale rejection of global
governance is one reaction to its deﬁcits, reforms that address its legitimacy problems
is another. It is our belief that as the former becomes untenable, the latter will increase
in likelihood. Nevertheless, we readily acknowledge that the immediate prospect of our
proposals being adopted is close to zero. As such, our contribution is an argument
about improving the global governance system: it is not a prediction about what
will happen.
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This leads us to the question of feasibility. Surely attempts to constitutionalise the G20
would be met with great power opposition. It is no secret that current trends in inter-
national relations are at odds with the spirit of multilateralism. The populist backlash of
recent years has produced a veritable array of nationalist actors best personiﬁed by the
America Frist policy of the Trump administration. Around the world key participants in
the global governance system – including emerging BRIC economies – have actively
sought to disrupt the post-war liberal order. Combined with the recent crisis of EU govern-
ance and a stalled agenda at the WTO, it is fair to say that the global governance system
has seen brighter days. Yet there is reason to believe that opposition to a permanent G-
forum will be less pronounced than sceptics expect. The example of IMF reform serves
as a useful point in case. In 2010 the IMF Board of Governors agreed to a reform
package to address the growing discrepancy between emerging powers’ economic con-
tribution and their vote share at the institution.38 The reforms aimed to partially close the
gap and therefore preserve ‘the eﬀectiveness and legitimacy’ of the lending body.39 Yet for
the reforms to take full eﬀect they needed the backing of existing member states, includ-
ing the United States, its largest shareholder.40 Although opposition in Washington was
acute, Congress nevertheless passed the reform package in December 2015 after a
budget compromise occasioned a review of the matter.41
The anecdote is telling for two reasons. First, opposition to global governance arrange-
ments in the United States is perennial, not least with the current Trump administration.
Yet the ﬁckle nature of American politics should not preclude the possibility of a tack in
policy direction. A more sympathetic American administration could conceivably take
up the cause of reform. Indeed, Ikenberry argues that the history of liberal internationalism
has always been premised on the idea that reform is possible.42 Therefore recognising and
seizing on opportunities, however small, is an important ﬁrst step.
The second critique argues that the G-forum was meant to be an elite steering commit-
tee, and to expand the forum would be to undermine its usefulness. The assumption is
based on the need for discretion at high-level summits. The argument goes that transpar-
ency hinders the candid exchange of views and undermines trust between leaders.
Indeed, to the extent that the G20 operates as a coordinating body, the ability to speak
openly and candidly must be preserved. We see, however, no good reason why transpar-
ency rules (in the manner we propose) would limit free exchange. We do not suggest that
private conversations between heads of government should be recorded. That, to our
minds, would be invasive and counterproductive. We only argue that decision-taking
should follow procedural rules that prevent institutionalised inequality. In the ﬁnal calcu-
lus, the beneﬁts of transparency as outlined in the previous section far outweigh the
potential drawbacks.
Conclusion
Despite the aforementioned problems, we argue that the beneﬁts of institutionalisation
outweigh the possible setbacks. A more active and engaged G20 holds the potential to
enhance global governance by oﬀering much-needed direction and coordination in
uncertain times, while also mitigating blowback from social movements and states with
less power in the international system. We recognise that the reforms suggested here
are by no means exhaustive and acknowledge the political diﬃculty in seeking a treaty-
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bound organisation. Even so, charting a continued course of informality would be a
mistake.
A new sense of purpose is needed in global governance to combat the myriad chal-
lenges we face as an international community. A forum which occasionally puts out
ﬁres but has no long-term strategy or vision is ultimately a missed opportunity. Establish-
ing a treaty-bound organisation which empowers meta-governance and delegates
between competencies would have a positive ripple eﬀect on global governance as a
whole. Whether the next 20 years will be used to establish a more legitimate and
eﬀective global governance system could be decisive for the future of humankind.
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